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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
  Martin Guzman Ambriz was convicted of felony driving under the influence 
(“DUI”) following the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.  On appeal, he 
contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officers 
who stopped his vehicle did not have a reasonable suspicion that he was driving under 
the influence or had committed a traffic offense.  The officers testified that, when 
executing a right turn, the right front tire of Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle entered the gravel on 
the side of an unlined and unmarked roadway.  They also testified that after properly 
signaling and executing a second right turn approximately one minute later, Mr. Ambriz 
made quick, jerky movements within his lane of travel, though they acknowledged that 
these movements appeared less quick and less jerky on the video recording of the 
incident.  Mr. Ambriz’s driving pattern did not fall outside the broad range of what can be 
described as normal driving behavior, and he did not commit a traffic offense.  The 
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a stop of Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle and the 
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.   
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Ambriz was driving a white Oldsmobile Bravada at approximately 8:45 pm on 
May 10, 2015.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.6, L.18 – p.7, L.11.)  Cassia County Deputy Sheriffs 
Nicole Zalewski and Brynn Reusze were riding together in a patrol car,1 and observed 
Mr. Ambriz “drive off the road into the gravel to the right side” when he turned from 
                                            
1 Officers Zalewski and Reusze were riding together because Officer Zalewski was in 
training at the time.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.6, Ls.21-24.) 
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Hillcrest onto East 16th Street near Pomerelle Avenue in Burley, Idaho.  (9/28/15 
Tr., p.7, Ls.8-28; p.13, Ls.20-22; p.30, Ls.11-23.)  East 16th Street is a two-lane road, 
but does not contain any line or lane markings.  (Def. Ex. A, ATT0015, 00:00-00:25.)  
Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle “hit the gravel on the right-hand side of the road and then . . . came 
back onto the roadway.”  (9/28/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-19.)  His “full right [front] tire went into 
the gravel.”  (9/28/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.23-24.)   
The officers followed Mr. Ambriz for “several blocks” and observed him make a 
right turn onto Pomerelle Avenue approximately one minute later.2  (9/28/15 Tr., p.8, 
Ls.5-8.)  Mr. Ambriz signaled for the appropriate length of time prior to executing the 
turn.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.17, Ls.17-19; Def. Ex. A, ATT0015, 00:15-00:25.)  Officer Reusze 
testified that “[a]s it made the right-hand turn, the vehicle shook side to side and made 
like quick, jerky motions,” but did not leave its lane.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.31, Ls.14-18; p.35, 
Ls.10-14.)  Officer Zalewski testified that the vehicle “started making a jerking motion” 
after the turn, but did not leave its lane.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.8, Ls.3-8; p.17, L.25 – p.18, L.7; 
p.19, Ls.3-6.)  She described the motion as “a very quick side-to-side motion . . . not 
usual of a driving pattern.”  (9/28/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.3-7.)  She acknowledged, however, 
that on the video recording of the incident, the jerking appeared “very slight” and could 
have been a sign of intoxication or drowsiness or a consequence of the driver adjusting 
the radio.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.20, Ls.3-23; p.27, Ls.8-17.) 
                                            
2 Officer Zalewski testified that Mr. Ambriz drove onto the gravel on East 16th Street 
“right before the camera started recording.”  (9/28/15 Tr., p.32, Ls.3-21.)  The camera 
recorded approximately 45 seconds before the traffic stop.  (Def. Ex. A., ATT0015, 
00:00-00:45.) 
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The officers activated their patrol car’s emergency lights and stopped 
Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.31, Ls.22-24.)  Officer Reusze testified they 
stopped Mr. Ambriz because they “believed he might be impaired, might be unsafe for 
him to be driving” and “needed to check it out.”  (9/28/15 Tr., p.33, Ls.19-25.)  Officer 
Zalewski testified they stopped Mr. Ambriz “[b]ecause he went off the road into the 
gravel, and then he kept doing the side-to-side jerk.”  (9/28/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.12-16.)  
Mr. Ambriz did not successfully complete the field sobriety tests and his blood alcohol 
content was measured at .209 and .195.  (R., p.10.)  He was issued a citation for failure 
to purchase a driver’s license and was arrested for felony DUI.  (R., p.10.)  He was 
never ticketed for a traffic violation.  (R., p.10.)   
Mr. Ambriz waived a preliminary hearing and was charged by Information with 
felony DUI.  (R., pp.29, 40-42.)  He filed a motion to suppress, arguing the stop of his 
vehicle violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and under the Idaho Constitution.  (R., p.60.)  At the suppression hearing, 
Officers Zalewski and Reusze testified for the State, and the parties stipulated to the 
admission of a dash cam video recording of the incident.  (R., pp.83-84, 87; 9/28/15 
Tr., p.39, Ls.9-20.)  Mr. Ambriz testified that he did not drive onto the gravel when he 
turned onto East 16th Street.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.41, Ls.10-22.)  He also testified that he did 
not make any jerky movements while driving on Pomerelle Avenue.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.41, 
L.23 – p.42, L.3.)  He admitted he had consumed alcohol earlier in the day, but denied it 
affected his recollection of his driving.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.43, Ls.5-22; p.45, Ls.7-19.)   
The district court denied Mr. Ambriz’s motion to suppress, concluding the stop of 
his vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion.  (R., pp.91-96.)  The district court 
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found Mr. Ambriz’s ability to clearly perceive and accurately recall the events to be 
“questionable” considering his alcohol consumption “and his eventual arrest for driving 
under the influence.”  (R., p.95.)  The district court concluded the driving pattern testified 
to by the officers “was not within the broad range of normal driving behaviors” and the 
officers thus “had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was being driven contrary to 
traffic laws or that other criminal activity was afoot.”  (R., p.95.)  The district court did not 
specify which traffic laws may have been violated. 
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Ambriz entered into an 
agreement with the State pursuant to which he pled guilty to felony DUI, reserving his 
right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress, and the State dismissed a 
related case (charging failure to purchase or invalid driver’s license) and recommended 
a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and with a period of retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.102-03, 127.)  The district court accepted Mr. Ambriz’s guilty plea 
and sentenced him to a unified term of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction for 365 days.  (R., pp.103, 131, 137.)  The judgment of conviction and order 
retaining jurisdiction was entered on February 16, 2016.  (R., pp.136-38.)  Mr. Ambriz 
filed a timely notice of appeal on March 2, 2016.  (R., pp.140-41.)    
 5 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ambriz’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ambriz’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The district court erred when it denied Mr. Ambriz’s motion to suppress because 
Officers Reusze and Zalewski did not have a reasonable suspicion that he was driving 
under the influence or had committed a traffic offense.  The officers testified that, when 
executing a right turn onto an unlined and unmarked roadway, the right front tire of 
Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle entered the gravel on the right side of the road.  They also testified 
that after properly signaling and executing a second right turn approximately one minute 
later, Mr. Ambriz made quick, jerky movements within his lane of travel.  This pattern of 
behavior did not fall outside the broad range of what can be described as normal, and 
did not provide the officers with a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Ambriz was driving 
under the influence.  In addition, the State did not establish, or even argue, that 
Mr. Ambriz committed a traffic violation.  When the officers stopped Mr. Ambriz’s 
vehicle, they lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and the stop thus violated 
Mr. Ambriz’s rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.     
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a 
motion to suppress.  State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012).  The Court will accept 
the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.”  State v. Wulff, 157 
Idaho 416, 418 (2014).  However, the Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.”  Danney, 153 Idaho at 408. 
 7 
C. The Stop Of Mr. Ambriz’s Vehicle Was Not Supported By Reasonable Suspicion  
 
A traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.  See State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007).  However, 
“[l]imited investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by an officer’s 
reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a 
crime.”  State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013) (citation omitted).  “Reasonable 
suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that 
can be drawn from those facts . . . and requires more than a mere hunch or inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion.”  Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).  “The test 
for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the 
officer at or before the time of the stop.”  Id. (citation omitted).   
 In State v. Neal, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that “there are two possible 
justifications for a traffic stop—the officer has reasonable suspicion that a driver has 
committed an offense, such as a traffic offense, or the officer has reasonable suspicion 
of other criminal activity, such as driving under the influence.”  159 Idaho 439, ___, 362 
P.3d 514, 517 (2015).  Here, the district court concluded the officers “had reasonable 
suspicion that [Mr. Ambriz’s] vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic laws or that 
other criminal activity was afoot.”  (R., p.95.)  The district court erred. 
 
1. Officers Reusze and Zalewski Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion That 
Mr. Ambriz Was Driving Under The Influence  
 
In State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661 (Ct. App. 1991), the Court of Appeals 
considered whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was 
driving under the influence where, in the early morning, the officer observed the 
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defendant’s vehicle remain still for a few seconds after a traffic light turned green, and 
then proceed straight down the street, close to parked cars.  Id. at 662.  The Court 
concluded the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because 
“[t]he evidence adduced by the officer could just as easily be explained as conduct 
falling within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior.”  Id. 
at 664.  The Court explained: 
It is self-evident that motorists often pause at a stop sign or traffic light 
when their attention is distracted or preoccupied by outside influences . . .  
.  Likewise, driving a vehicle within one foot of parked cars on a narrow 
street is equally insignificant . . . .  [The defendant’s] vehicle was in its 
proper lane and was moving in a straight line down the street.  No 
weaving or crossing of the center dividing line was observed by the officer.  
Such conduct can hardly be described as suspicious. 
 
Id.    
 Like in Emory, the driving pattern observed by the officers here could just as 
easily be explained by conduct falling within the broad range of what can be described 
as normal driving behavior; as such, it did not provide the officers with reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Ambriz was driving under the influence.  The officers observed two 
instances of concern.  They first observed Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle enter the gravel on the 
right side of a road that did not contain any lane or edge markings while making a right 
turn.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-19.)  The State did not argue that this conduct violated any 
traffic law and Mr. Ambriz was not ticketed for a traffic offense.  It would appear self-
evident that, when turning onto a road without any lane or edge markings, a vehicle 
should stay as far right as possible so as not to interfere with opposing traffic.  The 
Idaho Supreme Court recognized as much in State v. Neil, when it considered whether 
two instances of moving onto the fog line were sufficient to establish reasonable 
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suspicion of driving under the influence.  362 P.3d at 518.  The Court held they were 
not, noting “the motor vehicle code in general often encourages or requires drivers to 
move to the right” and “[t]herefore driving onto the right edge marker would not seem to 
be a safety concern.”  362 P.3d at 521.  The same reasoning applies here.  
Mr. Ambriz’s conduct of driving briefly into the gravel while making a right turn onto East 
16th Street did not pose a safety concern and was not suggestive of impaired driving. 
 Approximately one minute after observing Mr. Ambriz turn onto East 16th Street, 
the officers observed him turn right onto Pomerelle Avenue, and begin making side-to-
side movements within his lane.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.8, Ls.3-8; p.17, L.25 – p.18, L.7; p.19, 
Ls.3-6.)  These movements are visible on the video recording and, as Officer Zalewski 
recognized at the suppression hearing, appear “very slight.”  (9/28/15 Tr., p.20, Ls.3-
23.)  This conduct can hardly be described as suspicious, when it could have easily 
resulted from drowsiness or adjusting the radio.  (9/28/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.8-17.)  Like the 
driving behavior observed in Emory and Neal, Mr. Ambriz’s side-to-side movements 
were not sufficient to arouse reasonable suspicion that he was driving under the 
influence.  Mr. Ambriz was driving neither too fast nor too slow; it was neither early in 
the morning nor late at night; the weather conditions were favorable and visibility was 
not good; and Mr. Ambriz properly signaled his turn onto Pomerelle Avenue.  The 
officers did not have reasonable suspicion that Mr. Ambriz was driving under the 
influence.   
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2. Officers Reusze and Zalewski Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion That 
Mr. Ambriz Had Committed A Traffic Offense 
 
The district court also erred to the extent it concluded that the officers had 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic laws, 
which could have provided another justification for the stop of his vehicle.  See Neal, 
362 P.3d at 517.  The State did not articulate a particular traffic law that Mr. Ambriz may 
have violated.  Mr. Ambriz’s driving, as testified to by the officers and as visible on the 
video recording, does not appear to have violated any traffic law in Idaho.  As the Court 
recognized in Neal, “[m]ovement toward the right edge of the highway, roadway, or 
main traveled way is not prohibited in the motor vehicle code except where the driver 
must yield to someone else who has the right of way.”  362 P.3d at 521.  “This comports 
with the overall purpose of the motor vehicle code, which was designed to protect 
motorists and other persons using Idaho’s roads from a particular harm caused by 
persons operating motor vehicles thereon.”  Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Mr. Ambriz’s driving into the gravel and side-to-side movement within his lane did not 
create a risk of harm to other motorists and was not contrary to any traffic laws.  
It is impossible to know the real reason the officers stopped Mr. Ambriz’s 
vehicle—perhaps it was because of his driving pattern; perhaps it was because they 
had some other concern about him, his vehicle, or the area in which he was driving.  
Whatever the real reason, the stop of Mr. Ambriz’s vehicle was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and thus violated his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ambriz respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the 
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district 
court for further proceedings.   
 DATED this 19th day of July, 2016. 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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